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A CLARIFICATION OF THE ADEQUATE STATE GROUND DOCTRINE?
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970)
In 1911, Senator A. 0. Bacon devised certain property to the city of
Macon in trust for the creation of a park for the exclusive use of the
city's white citizens.' The city maintained the property as a park named
Baconsfield according to the terms of the trust, until desegregation was
thought necessary to comply with the constitutional standards of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Upon desegregation, six heirs of
Senator Bacon contended that the trust had failed and should revert to
the estate of Senator Bacon. In order to prevent this result, the city
resigned as trustee and in its place a private trustee continued the policy
of racial segregation. In 1966 the Supreme Court, in Evans v. Newton,
2
held that Baconsfield could not continue to be operated on a segregated
basis, since the park, being a municipal function, had taken on a public
character and continued racial discrimination would be unconstitutional
state action prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
Upon remand the Georgia trial court declared that as a result of the
decision in Newton the trust had failed and the trust property would
revert to the six living heirs of Senator Bacon. 3 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed, refusing to use the doctrine of cy pres to save the
charitable trust.4 The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the
decision,5 two justices dissenting, held: "the action of the Georgia
Supreme Court declaring the Baconsfield trust terminated presents no
violation of constitutionally protected rights. .... 6
1. The language of the will was as follows: "'. . . for the sole, perpetual and unending, use,
benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys and children of the City of
Macon," Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,441 (1970).
2. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
3. In remanding the case to the trial court, the Georgia Supreme Court also expressed the belief
that the sole purpose of the trust had failed. 211 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
4. There are three generally recognized requirements for the use of the cypres doctrine (1) a valid
charitable trust; (2) it must be impossible, illegal, or impractical to carry out the exact terms of the
trust; (3) there must be a general charitable intent. The language used by Bacon in his will was held
by the Georgia courts to have failed to convey the requisite intent. Thus the state cypres statutes,
GA. CODE ANN. 108-202 (1967) and 113-815 (1967), were inapplicable. A resulting trust was created
in favor of the settlor's heirs by statute, GA. CODE ANN. 108-106(4) (1967).
5. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
6. Id. at 444. Newton was reconciled by pointing out that in that decision the court held the park
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This narrow holding is based primarily upon the rationale that
elimination of a public park injures all citizens equally; rather than
enforcing private discrimination, the state courts have "eliminated all
discrimination . . . by eliminating the park itself."7 While affirming the
traditional right of the state to apply its trust laws as it deems proper,8
the Court suggested that so long as the state court treated this trust as it
would any other charitable trust, there could be no complaint.9 The
Court thereby answered the petitioners' arguments based on the state
trust laws.
Implicit within this result is the holding that the state court's decision
rested on an adequate state ground and therefore the Court is precluded
from looking behind the decision for a possible violation of federal
constitutional rights. As will be seen below, the Court's approach to the
state law question may indicate a shift in the Court's traditional
treatment of the adequate state ground rule.
The doctrine, as first enunciated by the Court in Murdock v.
Memphis, 0 dictated that the Supreme Court will not review a decision of
the highest court of a state if that decision rests on an adequate and
independent state ground. Thus if a case was decided exclusively on an
adequate state ground, the Supreme Court will not review the decision
even though a federal question was contained in the case."
The problem that has concerned the Court since Murdock is the
definition of "adequate". The Court has developed a series of guiding
principles which serve as a foundation from which to examine the facts
of each particular case. If the decision of the state court is without any
fair or substantial support, it will be inadequate. ' 2 If a new rule has been
invented by the state court to deprive a petitioner of federal
could not continue to be operated on a racially discriminatory basis. The decision in Abney
eliminates the park, thereby eliminating the unconstitutional discrimination.
7. 396 U.S. at 445.
8. Id. at 447. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas contended that Bacon's purpose in
creating the trust was to dedicate the land to a municipal use. That desire could be better served by
continuing the use of the property as a desegregated public park, than by allowing it to revert to the
heirs. 396 U.S. at 448-50. In a separate dissent, Justice Brennan found unconstitutional state action
in the closing of the park. 396 U.S. at 450-59.
9. Id. at 446.
10. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
1I. Justice Jackson, in an oft-quoted statement, has declared the principle as follows: "We are
not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the
state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion." Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
12. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
[Vol. 1971:485
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/7
STATE GROUND DOCTRINE
constitutional rights, the Court will consider the state ground
inadequate." Implicit in this principle is the examination of state
precedent to determine if the contested decision is consistent with the
case law."'
In Fay v. Noia,5 a case dealing with habeas corpus jurisdiction in the
federal district courts, the Court made explicit a distinction that had
been suggested earlier between state substantive and state procedural
grounds. "While it [the Court] has deferred to state substantive grounds
so long as they are not patently evasive of or discriminatory against
federal rights, it has sometimes refused to defer to state procedural
grounds only because they made burdensome the vindication of federal
rights."'"
Two years later in Henry v. Mississippi, 7 the Court, while ostensibly
applying "settled principles", seemed to have devised a new rule of
construction when using the adequate state ground doctrine. It stated
that federal rights will not be thwarted by a state's insistence upon
compliance with a procedural rule unless that rule "serves a legitimate
state interest."' 8 Since the decision in Henry, there has been much
discussion as to its effect on the rule, in particular, whether the Court
was merely using new language to state what it has traditionally said or
whether Henry was a departure from precedent and an entirely new
rule." No firm answers have emerged and many questions remained at
the time the Court decided Abney. Though apparently intended to
pertain only to state procedural grounds, did Henry have validity as a
13, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964): NAACP v. Alabama ex tel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
14. Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288
(1964); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); see generally Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi
and The Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 220-
26.
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
16. Id. at 432. Most of the cases involving state substantive grounds have arisen in connection
with various aspects of contract law; see Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942) (scope and
nature of contract); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935) (severability of contract
clauses); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 66 U.S. (I Black) 436 (1862) (impairment of
contractual obligation). The Court has traditionally deferred to the state court upon such state law
questions, unless the decision is "6manifestly wrong" [Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment and Review,
302 U.S. 95 (1937)]; or "'palpably erroneous" [Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937)].
17. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
18. Id. at 447.
19. See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COL. L. REV. 943 (1965); Sandalow, Henry v.
Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
187.
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standard for judging state substantive grounds? If not, then did the
standard developed in Fay still control the Court's determination of an
adequate state substantive ground?
While the petitioners' main allegation raised a federal question based
on Shelley v. Kraemer,2 an ancillary issue was whether application of
the state trust laws by the Georgia Supreme Court to the Baconsfield
trust was inadequate and discriminatory. Thus the adequacy of the state
ground was squarely in issue. Justice Black apparently expressed the
standard he would use in deciding the issue in these words: ". . . [T]he
constitution imposes no requirement upon the Georgia court to
approach Bacon's will any differently than it would approach any will
creating any charitable trust of any kind."' 21 Having stated the test,
Justice Black seems to ignore its implicit mandate that the Court
undertake an independent examination of Georgia precedent to
determine if the state courts have treated this trust as they would any
other. The Court accepted the state court's finding that Bacon lacked a
general charitable intention and that cy pres was thus inapplicable. Yet
an examination of the opinion of both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Georgia Supreme Court fails to reveal convincing case law to support
these conclusions. 2
An examination of Georgia cases indicates that the state ground relied
on by the Court is at least questionable under the guidelines set out by
Justice Black as well as under the principles developed in past cases. 2
Although the doctrine of cy pres has been seldom used in Georgia,
charitable trusts have enjoyed a favored status in that state since at least
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21. 396 U.S. at 446.
22. Id. Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188, 200 S.E. 689 (1938) is cited by the Court as stating the
generally recognized purpose of a state cypres statute. Yerbey v. Chandler, 194 Ga. 263, 21 S.E.2d
636 (1942), used as support for a general rule of construction, does not deal with cypres. The Court
cites two cases as supporting the refusal to use cy pres: in one of them, Ford v. Thomas, I ll Ga.
493, 36 S.E. 841 (1900), the issue was not whether cypres would be used, but whether the particular
application of the doctrine was required by the factual situation; the second case, Adams v. Bass, 18
Ga. 130 (1855) is of doubtful relevance since it was decided eight years before the first cypres statute
was enacted.
23. A distinction might be drawn between a sympathetic attitude toward charitable trusts and the
use of cypres to redesign a purpose incapable of execution. Older Georgia cases were unsympathetic
to cypres. See American Colonization Soc'y v. Gartell, 23 Ga. 448 (1857); Adams v. Bass, 18 Ga.
130 (1855); Hunter v. Bass, 18 Ga. 127 (1855).
The state cy pres statute enacted after these cases demonstrates an attempt to counteract this
judicial attitude, GA. CODE ANN. § 108-202 (1967); "cypres - when a valid charitable bequest is
incapable for some reason of execution in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor, or
founder, a court of equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will as nearly as possible effectuate
his intention." See also GA. CODE ANN. § 113-815 (1967).
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1848.24 A necessary but implicit consequence of this stated policy is that
the courts will do everything possible to prevent reversion of the trust res
to the heirs of the settlor.
Despite some commentary to the contrary, 25 most state courts have
not hesitated to use their equitable powers of construction to save many
different kinds of charitable trusts.2 6 In Georgia, state courts have
consistently upheld charitable trusts against claims that the beneficiaries
were too indefinite,2 7 the purpose of the trust was impossible to carry
out,2 or the trust should fail for want of a trustee.
2 9
24. In that year. the Georgia Supreme Court stated in Beall v. Fox, 4 Ga. 404 (1848), that it was
the policy of the state to favor charitable trusts. In Beckwith v. Recor, 69 Ga. 564 (1882). the court
went further, "Courts look with favor upon such trusts and take special care to enforce them, to
guard them from assault and protect them from abuse." Id. at 569-570. This policy has continued
to the present day: e.g.. Simpson v. Anderson. 220 Ga. 155, 137 S.E.2d 638 (1964); Hardage v.
Hardage. 211 Ga. 80.84 S.E2d 54 (1954). Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188, 200 S.E. 689 (1938);
King v. Horton, 149 Ga. 361. 100 S.E. 103 (1919).
25. See note, Reversion o] a Public Park in Lieu of Integration: A Disadvantage of the Freedom
of Testation. 24 Sw. L.J. 717, 721 (1970).
26. See Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College, 461 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1969);
Bank of Delaware v. Buckson. 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d
719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Coffee v. William Marsh Rich University, 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966). Contra, LaFond v. Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959); Moore v. Denver,
133 Colo. 190. 292 P.2d 986 (1956). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.
1968). cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.
Va. 1967); Dagget v. Children's Center. 28 Conn. Supp. 468, 266 A.2d 72 (Super. Ct. 1970)
(religious restriction stricken by use of cy pres); In Re Hawley's Estate, 32 Misc.2d 624, 223
N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1961)(court used cypres to remove religious restriction).
Many modern authorities have also argued for the expanded use of the courts' equitable powers
to save charitable trusts. See A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399.3 at 3111 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399, Comment B (1959). See generally G. BOGART, TRUST AND TRUSTEES
436 at 424 (2d ed. 1964); E. FISCH, THE CY PRs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 153-159 (1950);
FISCH. Changing Concepts of Cy Pres. 44 CORNELL L. Q. 382 (1959); Parker, Evans v. Newton and
the Racially Restricted Charitable Trust. 13 How. L. J. 223 (1967); Power, The Racially
Discriminatory Charitable Trust: A Suggested Treatment, 9 ST. Louis L. REv. 478 (1965); Note,
Mandatory Cy Pres and the Racially Restrictive Charitable Trust, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1478
(1969)(author advocates mandatory cypres in cases like Abney).
27. See Strother v. Kennedy, 218 Ga. 180, 127 S.E.2d 19 (1962) (trust for use in establishing and
maintaining a home for indigent colored people 60 years of age or older residing in Augusta);
Houston v. Mills Memorial Home, 202 Ga. 540, 43 S.E.2d 680 (1947); Perkins v. Citizens and
Southern Nat'l Bank, 190 Ga. 29, 8 S.E.2d 28 (1940); Goree v. Georgia Indus. Home, 187 Ga. 368,
200 S.E. 684 (1938); King v. Horton, 149 Ga. 36 1, 100 S.E. 103 (1919); Hills v. Atlanta Art Assoc.,
145 Ga. 856, 89 S.E. 1084 (1916).
28. See Simpson v. Anderson, 220 Ga. 155, 137 S.E.2d 638 (1964); Goree v. Georgia Indus.
Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 684 (1938); Huger v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 137 Ga. 205, 73
S.E. 385 (1911).
29. Creech v. Scottish Rite Hosp., 211 Ga. 195, 84 S.E.2d 563 (1954); Huger v. Protestant
Episcopal Church, 137 Ga. 205, 73 S.E. 385 (1911); Ford v. Thomas, IIl Ga. 493, 36 S.E. 841
(1900).
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As noted above, 30 the court must find the settlor had a general
charitable intention before cy pres can be used to re-write the trust
purpose in approximate conformity with the settlor's intent. In Abney,
the Georgia Supreme Court found that Bacon's intent was not general,
but specifically directed toward the white citizens of Macon; therefore,
the trust purpose was impossible to accomplish to any degree. 31 In the
past, Georgia courts have gone to great lengths to save established
charitable trusts which might have reverted to the heirs of the settlor
years after their creation. In the recent case of Harris v. Georgia
Military A cademy,32 the heirs of the grantor attempted to have property
on which the Academy stands revert to them, because proposed changes
in the school charter were in conflict with the grantor's wishes. The
school proposed to change the name, admit girls as students and abolish
military training for its students. The charter of the Academy stated the
gift was "for a charitable and educational institution as hereinafter set
out." The charter then goes on to explicitly detail the creation of a
military school for boys. In saving the trust and upholding the proposed
changes, the Georgia Supreme Court chose to find a general charitable
intention in the charter. The purpose of the grantor to create a
"charitable and educational institution" could still be carried out, thus
the express reversion clause in the grantor's will would not take effect .3
The result in Harris is an indication of how far the court will go to
prevent reversion of an established trust.35
Against these two aspects of established public policy in
Georgia-favoring of charitable trusts and dislike of reversions to
heirs-stands the decision in Abney. The fact that the Georgia courts
30. Note 4 supra.
31. See Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160, 166 (1968).
32. 221 Ga. 721, 146 S.E.2d 913 (1966).
33. Id. at 915.
34. In noting that conditions subsequent are not favored in Georgia, the court approved the
following language: ". . . no provision will be interpreted to create such a condition if the language
will bear any other reasonable interpretation, or unless the language used equivocally indicates an
intention upon the part of the grantor or devisor to that effect and plainly admits of such
construction." 146 S.E.2d at 915. See also Hollomon v. Board of Educ., 168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882
(1927); Thomson v. Hart, 133 Ga. 542, 66 S.E. 270 (1909); Tift v. Savannah, F.W. Ry., 102 Ga.
809, 30 S.E. 266 (1898).
35. See Saunders v. Flanigan, 180 Ga. 79, 178 S.E. 283 (1935). The court refused to grant a
citizen taxpayer's motion for injunctive relief to stop the school district from operating a school
building because the method of electing the managers of the school was at variance with the terms of
the trust establishing the school. The court noted that if the original trustees, named in the trust to
govern the school, had sued, ". . . it may be necessary to resort to the cypres doctrine in order to
prevent the trust from failing." Id. at 284. See also Bolick v. Cox, 145 Ga. 888, 90 S.E. 54 (1916).
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have seldom reached a result which simultaneously goes against both of
these public policies may indicate that even the strict test set out in Fay36
would have been satisfied had the Court examined the state law.
The failure to examine this underlying state law reveals a paradox
between the Court's words and its actions. The standard set out by
Justice Black-that all charitable trusts must be treated the
same-implies the necessity to examine prior state decisions to
determine whether discriminatory application of state law has
occurred.37 In reality, the Court is exercising its customary deference to
the decision of a state court on a substantive state law issue. It does so
even though a convincing argument can be made that the substantive
ground relied on in Abney is inconsistent with precedent and represents a
"novel rule" created to deprive petitioners of federal constitutional
rights .38
The approach taken by the Court in Abney may indicate that the
Court is moving toward a new test when dealing with state substantive
law problems. Under this test the state court judgment would be upheld
so long as there are substantive state law principles which, regardless of
the frequency of past application, can reasonably be applied to the case.
More probably, the Court is affirming the strict test announced in Fay
and thus rejecting the test announced in Henry when dealing with state
substantive law.
Since Justice Black failed to discuss adequate state grounds and
counsel for the petitioner failed to argue discriminatory application of
state law, it is difficult to predict with certainty whether Abney will
significantly affect the adequate state grounds doctrine. Because of the
Court's failure to discuss this issue the case could be easily distinguished
in any future problem concerning adequate state grounds; but following
the reasoning of this comment, a substantial limitation of the Court's
power to review decisions based upon substantive state grounds may be
in the process of formulation.
36. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
38. If the Court had held the state ground in Abney inadequate, it could have followed one of two
courses, both of which have been used by the Court when faced with the problem. After finding the
state ground inadequate, the Court could have reversed the judgment, holding that the treatment by
the Georgia Supreme Court of this trust was discriminatory and thus unconstitutional state action
in violation of the 14th amendment equal protection clause. If the Court had chosen not to follow
this approach, it could have remanded the case to the Georgia court, which would have been faced
squarely with a Shelley v. Kraemer type of case. The state court would have been unable to enforce
Bacon's private discrimination with the result that Baconsfield would have remained open on a
desegregated basis.
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